[ Background in football ]

Ever since I was a child, I've always loved sport. In primary school, I started playing ‘five-a-side football’ on those old stone rings (where if you fell, you'd skin your knees) with friends from school and the local parish. Throughout my childhood and adolescence, I always enjoyed watching various sports on television (mainly football, handball, basketball and roller hockey). I even thought about going into sport, but then I ended up choosing the economic area.

Despite my love of sport, I didn't become a federated player until I was 16. I chose basketball because it was the sport I enjoyed playing the most and the one I was best at. I played for Grupo Desportivo André Soares (GDAS), one of the best basketball teams in Braga (the city where I grew up). I was there until I was a senior. I spent two or three years in the seniors, but then I quit. Later, I returned to play for the recreational basketball team at the University of Minho, also in Braga (at the time I was studying for a master's degree in social economics). It was then that my coach invited me to coach the GDAS under-12s. In my first year, we became district champions. The following year, I moved to a football training school. Things continued to go well as we won a few tournaments and another district championship.

Meanwhile, in 2015, I took two scouting courses: 1) analysing players; 2) analysing teams. It's worth mentioning that, at the time, I already had a degree in economics and a master's degree in social economics. Although I'd had various professional experiences in this area, none were satisfying. I thought it was my problem. Later, I came to realise that I had simply gone into the wrong field.

In that sense, scouting appeared as an attempt to redirect my professional life towards sport. At the start of the 2016-17 season, I proposed the creation of a scouting department to the director and coach of SC Braga's senior futsal team. They accepted and I worked there for a year. It was a marvelous experience. Suddenly, the players I'd been following on television for years were there in front of me. We're talking about the third best futsal team in the country, with several national players who won the World Cup and are two-time European champions. It was also one of the best professional experiences I've had. I felt that the players sympathised with me and respected my dedication. What's more, this background in the world of sport has been essential for me to successfully carry out my research into match-fixing. As it's a sensitive subject, getting to know people in the sporting world is essential for gathering information.

[ Your earlier publications are on regional impacts on amateur teams and the impact of the golden generation on the Portuguese league - when did you realize you could research sociology in a football context? ]

I started doing research for a master's degree in social economy. I made the decision to take this master's degree after a brief volunteering experience with an organisation called the ‘Association for the Promotion of Fair Trade’. Having a degree in business economics, this decision represented my first attempt to change professional fields, or, to be more precise, from the private sector to the third sector (non-profit sector). During my master's degree, I met Professor Paulo Mourão who, in his classes, presented some studies he had developed in the field of sports economics. At the time I thought ‘if I have to do a dissertation, it might as well be in an area I like’.

So, I decided to invite Professor Mourão to advise me on my master's thesis. Nobody knows what they don't know and, when I got to know scientific research, I realised that this would be the right path for me. Those who run for pleasure never tire, and I ended up doing 85 per cent of my dissertation in the first year. By the time I started the second academic year, I already had my first scientific article published. A very rudimentary paper on the determinants of sporting competitiveness in football clubs in the Braga district championships. When I finished my master's degree, I challenged my supervisor to continue our partnership. We ended up publishing a new article in 2015 on the importance of golden generations in the competitiveness of professional football leagues. Although things went well, I was never able to find a job in the scientific field. I ended up doing other things.

One day, my professional career hit rock bottom. I found myself working on a production line at Bosch. Although the company provided good conditions for its workers, this was not what I had studied so hard for. I realised that I had exhausted all professional possibilities in the economic field. It was time to do something radical and follow my heart.

I decided to quit. I focused on what I felt I knew best and was most passionate about: research. I drew up an action plan based on applying for a PhD scholarship. A kind of job creation. I opted for a doctorate in economics, but I didn't have much confidence in that decision. In any case, I didn't think I had a chance of being selected if I pursued another academic area. Once again, I asked Professor Mourão to be my supervisor. We had a chat about possible topics, and he told me about sports betting. But the topic had nothing to do with match-fixing. Match-fixing was something I discovered when I got home and researched impactful topics related to sports betting.

From match-fixing, I came to Professor Marcelo Moriconi. In Portugal, he was (and still is, but now alongside me) the only reference in this area. As Professor Moriconi is a sociologist and I already had a supervisor, I invited him to be my co-supervisor. I travelled to Lisbon (the city where I was born) to meet him and he asked me about my background in sport. He was enthusiastic about my experiences and contacts in sport and asked me if I was interested in collaborating on the project ‘Training and Protecting Reporting Systems’ (T-PREG), a project funded by the European Commission on whistleblowing practices and mechanisms in sport. I started reading literature on match-fixing in two scientific fields: economics and sociology.

Although the passion for research was there, I didn't really like the methodology of economics; it was very econometric based. In sociology, on the other hand, I was able to reconcile my passion for the field and my ability to understand the methodology. I began to think that the decision to do a PhD in economics wasn't the best one. But I already had a PhD scholarship application submitted. When the results came out, I was happy not to win! Imagine that. I didn't hesitate and signed up for a PhD in Sociology at Iscte-IUL straight away. I supported the first year with money from the T-PREG project and other projects and in the second year, I won (relatively easily) a PhD scholarship.

[ What motivated or led to your ‘switch’ to match fixing, gambling and corruption topics? ]

In fact, I've never chosen to research match-fixing, gambling or corruption. When I do research, I put empiricism first. It's the evidence that drives the research. Of course, it's necessary to have an idea or research question that guides the field work. As I said, I started searching for information about sports betting and that's how I discovered match-fixing. I realised that it was a topic on the political and sporting agenda.

On an academic level, empirical poverty, analytical reductionism and under-theorisation predominated. In other words, there was a lot to do. That's why I prepared a PhD project on this topic. Then, as I said, I started working on a project about whistleblowing mechanisms in sport. I started the research with an exploratory approach, and this allowed me to realise that, as well as athletes being very reluctant to report irregularities/illegalities in sport, they were also in the habit of betting on their own matches and competitions. This motivated me to apply (PhD grant) to the European Association for the Study of Gambling (partners in the T-PREG project) to explore this issue. And so on. So, all the topics I've been studying are the result of prolonged research that began with the T-PREG project, and which has been broken down into different lines of research depending on the exploratory approach that I never give up.

[ How prevalent is match fixing in football today? Is it ‘easier’ at lower levels? (or riskier because of lower betting volume, etc?) ]

Internationally, there are some studies that address this issue. There is no national data. I have a project submitted to study this issue. We'll see if it's accepted. From my perspective, match-fixing has always existed in Portugal. In the past - according to the perspectives of the people I've spoken to – competition related match-fixing was very common. In the final stages of the season there were players who moved from one team to another, giving the idea that signing them was a way of paying back some favour (i.e. a deliberate reduction in income). In the meantime, things seem to have changed. This doesn't mean that this type of match-fixing has ceased to exist.

As part of the ‘Jogo Duplo’ project, a case of match-fixing that took place in the Portuguese 2nd League in the 2015-2016 season, competition related match-fixing is still present. But most of the case concerns betting related match-fixing. In fact, the national reality seems to have changed and is following the European paradigm. In this respect, a curious thing is that in the past, when a referee had a bad display, the players would say that the referee was bought by the opponent. Nowadays, when this happens, the players say it must have something to do with betting, especially in the case of handball. So, the perspective has changed.

As for the divisions where match-fixing is most prevalent, I'm curious to find out. The only certainty I have is that it's present in both professional and amateur sports. At the lower levels, I believe it's much easier because of the lower visibility. There are reports of people travelling to halls with half a dozen fans to collect data from 4th division basketball matches. These individuals collect data to put on the illegal market. It's hard to explain to a player at that level that he can't bet on an NBA game. It is also attractive for a manipulator to lure an amateur player with a bribe to rig a specific incident of the game, because the control mechanisms are very low.

For example, in the first knockout rounds of the Portuguese football cup, there are rumours of players from 4th division teams agreeing to lose their game against teams from lower divisions and betting on illegal markets. There's also the problem of insider trading. Former basketball colleagues of mine are constantly asked who is going to play? Who is unavailable? In the higher divisions, there are also many structures of opportunity. Wage arrears are a pervasive problem in Portuguese professional football. Then there's the unregulated investment that fosters opportunities for match-fixing. If the opportunities for the problem exist, rumours about gambling addiction are likely to remain.

[ Is that more or less than 20 years ago? 50 years ago? ]

I would say that the tendency towards crime will increase if the incentives for crime increase. Well, in Portugal, there has been a criminal reform that has toughened the penalties for corruption offences (passive and active) in the sporting arena, as well as creating offences such as ‘unsportsmanlike betting’, ‘fraudulent betting’, and ‘coercion in the sport. However, regardless of the reforms undertaken, if the motivations for crime remain the same, it is more likely that crime will continue to occur. In fact, the Portuguese Football Federation has been an exemplary pupil in implementing UEFA's zero tolerance policy, which translates into three pillars: monitoring (betting pattern monitoring systems); education (awareness sessions on the dangers of match-fixing) and sanctioning (disciplinary reform and legal reform).

Despite this, the research I have carried out together with Marcelo Moriconi suggests that this policy has been more effective in allocating responsibility to individual actors than in preventing the phenomenon. Why is this? Because typical compliance policy is weak in terms of preventative measures. For example, Boavista SAD failed to register for the 2025/26 professional football competitions due to the absence of non-debt certificates from the Tax Authority and Social Security. Although the regulations may be effective at the time of the sanction, this didn't prevent the club from having unpaid wages in the previous season. According to various studies, wage arrears are one of the main risk factors for match-fixing. FIFPro studies reveal that 50% of players approached to manipulate results have unpaid wages. To return to the example. Of course, the sanction has a preventive dimension. But it is essentially a punitive measure.

What I'm arguing for is that the financial control system should be demanding upstream, to prevent wage defaults from occurring. And I don't think that's difficult. It's a question of budgeting. Validating income and expenditure (actual and estimated). Boavista is an example of another problem. Unregulated investment. The majority investor of Boavista SAD is Gérard Lopez, the same owner of Girondins de Bordeaux. It's curious that two clubs that were national champions not so long ago have had the same misfortune under the leadership of the same person.

[ How does match fixing happen? (what ‘types’ are there? who is involved?) ]

There are two main types of match-fixing. Competition related match-fixing and betting related match-fixing. These two types differ according to the objectives pursued. While in the first case there is a predetermination of the result to obtain a sporting advantage, in the second case there is a predetermination of the result, or of a specific incident (a card, a penalty - spot fixing) to obtain an undue financial advantage in the betting market (legal or illegal).

Betting related match-fixing - the type I have studied most in depth - can be carried out in different ways: a) collusion between athletes, with or without the involvement of other sports players (coaches, managers); b) lone wolf match-fixing, i.e. the individual action of an athlete without the involvement of another person (e.g. goalkeeper Marco Paolini took a sleeping pill in the water at the request of a criminal group); c) with quid pro quo (e.g.: bribery, promise of a criminal group). d) coercion, i.e. mobilisation of intimidation/threatening resources; e) or investment in social relationships (e.g. mafia groups that invest in the sports training of athletes while they are still in their teens in order to use them when and if they reach a professional level.

From the outset, match-fixing implies that individuals with a direct influence on the outcome are involved: players; referees. As a rule, these are the actors who are manipulated, although they can be the instigators of the manipulation themselves. However, I believe that the most common instigators are other players. Institutional discourse tends to externalise the instigators of manipulation into organised criminal groups outside sport.

[ How is match fixing prevented? What safeguards, reporting, education, etc is in place? (+ is there a country/association that is doing a particularly good job with this?) ]

On 27 March 2013, the ‘Professional Football Strategy Council’ met to discuss the standardisation of parameters to prevent and combat all forms of match-fixing. At this meeting, the ‘European football family’ defined an action plan that was the basis for the resolution ‘European football united for the integrity of the game’. A year later, at the Astana Congress, this resolution was approved by all UEFA member associations. The resolution embodied UEFA's ‘zero tolerance’ policy, demonstrating the commitment of all the forces in European football to eradicating match-fixing. The document was based on five main axes: sanction (disciplinary), communication, education, cooperation and criminalisation.

Specifically, UEFA urged member associations to adopt, as a minimum and as soon as possible, the following disciplinary measures: a) Sanction match-fixing attempts or practices in a dissuasive manner; b) Sanction sports players (officials, referees, players or coaches) who bet on matches and competitions in which they are involved; c) Create protected reporting platforms for sports players to report match-fixing attempts or practices; d) Oblige sports players to report match-fixing attempts or practices to the competition organiser or the national federation's integrity officers; c) Implement training programmes to raise awareness among sports players, in particular referees, coaches and football players, about the dangers and consequences of match-fixing; d) Ensure that clubs are held accountable and sanctioned in situations where the instigators of match-fixing practices are their own managers or presidents.

The Portuguese Football Federation can be considered a good student, since it has followed all of UEFA's recommendations. But the problem doesn't lie in following these recommendations. As I said, the problem lies in going beyond the recommendations. Map out the structures of opportunity for match-fixing; implement (preventive) measures that eradicate these opportunities; monitor the results of the measures implemented to make the necessary adjustments.

I'm not familiar with the reality of all countries, but as far as I know, this work hasn't been done in Portugal. For example, I know that the mobile phone application ‘Red Button’, created in 2013 by the Finnish Football Players' Union and subsequently adopted by FIFPro, is recognised by UEFA as the most effective match-fixing protected reporting system. It is a reporting mechanism that, despite being hosted by a sports organisation, the report is automatically directed to the criminal police.

By contrast, in Portugal, the Portuguese Football Federation, Liga Portugal and the Professional Football Players Union have hosted the ‘Integrity’ reporting platform on their website. This platform is managed by the FPF, which filters the information reported before forwarding it to the competent authorities (criminal police and public prosecutors); thus, neglecting what are best practices in terms of protected reporting. This option not only raises security issues, but also promotes conflict of interest situations, particularly when the whistleblower exposes irregularities and/or illegalities that directly or indirectly jeopardise the entity that manages the platform.

[ What makes it so hard to prove or prosecute match fixing? ]

The difficulty of proving cases of match-fixing stems from the same difficulty of proving the crime of corruption. In the absence of concrete evidence (a wiretap, a message), it is difficult to link any deliberate reduction in performance with a prior intention to jeopardise a result or a specific incident of the game. Unlike other forms of manipulation of sporting competitions - such as doping, for example, where there is an anti-doping test that measures the level of banned substances in athletes' bodies - there is no instrument to identify the culprits of match-fixing. Monitoring systems record abnormal variations in the financial flows of sports betting, but they are not concrete proof, since such an abnormality is not always synonymous with match-fixing. An error in the calculation of an odd, for example, can be enough to cause a substantial increase in the financial amounts placed on a particular result or on a specific incidence of a match (this happens when professional bettors realise that, by applying ‘arbitrage’ techniques, they can make a guaranteed profit by placing a bet and a lay on the same sporting event). In addition, monitoring systems limit their supervision to the licensed market and can be easily circumvented by criminals by parcelling out bets.

[ Gambling seems more prominent than ever - what are some of the early trends or things to watch out for in the coming years? (e.g. top of my mind are cases like Sandro Tonali or Ivan Toney and their recent bans) ]

The relationship between sports betting and sport is entangled in benefits that also represent risks. On the one hand, the money from sports betting sponsorships and the gambling tax itself that goes to sports organisations (sports clubs, leagues, federations) represents a breath of fresh air for a sector that has been badly affected by Covid-19. On the other hand, this relationship also raises moral questions, since there are studies linking the aggressive marketing of sports betting in the sports sector to an increase in problem gambling. In other words, part of the betting money that finances sport comes from addicted gamblers. The solution to one problem is simultaneously the cause of another.

In addition, a consortium of international journalists has concluded that part of the betting money entering Europe's top football clubs comes from illegal markets. This happens when operators who can operate legally in certain countries accept bets from individuals who reside in countries where gambling is considered illegal.

Of course, footballers end up being aware of all this. At the same time, professional footballers are particularly prone to so-called ‘games of chance’. Like sportspeople in general, footballers are attracted by the adrenaline rush of competition, like to adopt risky behaviour, have plenty of free time and have the financial liquidity to gamble. The practice of ‘games of chance’ has always been part of the daily lives of footballers, and is one of the main collective activities used to occupy their free time, whether in training or travelling by bus to matches.

With the new institutional design of sports betting and the relative ease of betting in an unlicensed (and therefore unmonitored) bookmaker, I believe the tendency is for more cases like Tonali's or Paquetá's to occur. Remember that in 2017, Joey Barton, after being suspended for sports betting, mentioned that if the rules applied to everyone, half the league would be out...

[ What do you think about players betting on football? ]

There's no point in banning what can't be controlled. I've already argued at an international conference of the European Association for the Study of Gambling that it has been inefficient to ban athletes from betting on their competitions and games.

Let's see, a ban is there for a purpose. In this case, the aim is to protect sporting integrity and the sports betting business. Knowing that there is an illegal market that is not monitored and that the use of unlicensed operators is child's play, do you think that if a player wants to bet on a game or an incident that he knows will be rigged, he won't do it just because it's banned? He will do it in a camouflaged way by asking someone to bet for him on the legal market, or by resorting to unlicensed operators in his country. So once access to the unlicensed market is easy, the ban becomes hollow. That's why I think it would be a win-win situation for athletes to be able to bet. It would be a way of bringing them into the legal market and, consequently, controlling them. However, I would argue that they should be subject to some specific rules, such as not betting against their team (most athletes don't tolerate this).

[ I have a hunch (not based on any fact or information) that match fixing (like doping) in football must be more common than the ‘average fan’ perceives. Simply based on the huge (and increasing) stakes financially - and tons of evidence from other industries (e.g. when lots of money is at stake, people cut corners) - it seems to me the incentives for match fixing (or related forms of cheating) are very high. Yet, true scandals are still relatively rare. One possible explanation for this could be that associations and federations are turning a ‘blind eye’ to all but the most serious forms of this as the fallout from cheating scandals is so messy and generally undesirable. — do you think this ‘theory’ is possible? ]

I prefer to focus on the evidence. There is an opaque culture in the sports system. I've seen that in the media scandals involving FIFA and UEFA. It's also true that a match-fixing scandal can drive away sponsors. It's also true that many of the structures of opportunity for match-fixing are the result of shortcomings in the governance of sporting bodies (e.g. non-compliance with salaries; unregulated investment; false amateurism, etc.). It is therefore normal for sports organisations to want to ‘shake the water off their backs’.

I have received (informal) information that there are sports federations that prefer not to investigate what is going on so as not to discover anything compromising, while there are others that are concerned with understanding how they can improve their preventive mechanisms. I've also heard that a certain federation was aware of several cases of match-fixing that were (allegedly) taking place, but as the police were looking for the ‘big dogs’ (individuals from organised criminal groups), they couldn't act straight away or else they would only catch the ‘little guys’ (manipulated players).

[ What’s the next step in your career? ]

The next step is a post-doctorate. I have projects submitted in the field of match-fixing, but also in the field of sexual harassment. Now I have to wait. I intend to diversify my research into other deviant phenomena in sport.